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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DONALD BUCKNER, 
Respondent, I 
vs. 
' Case No. 8345 
MAIN REALTY AND INSURANCE 1 
COMPANY, a Corporation, and ) 
ROBERT STEVENSON, 
Appellants. 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are simple and without dispute, and for the 
purpose of clarity we shall refer to the parties as they were 
below. 
On the 22nd day of September, 1954, Plaintiff filed an 
action against the Defendants in this cause in the City Court 
of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 18). 
The Defendant, Robert Stevenson, was served with Summons 
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in this matter personally (R. 17), and Defendant, Main Realty 
& Insurance Company, erroneously denominated a Corporation 
by the Plaintiff, was purportedly served with Summons by a 
copy of the Summons being delivered and left with one, Jean 
Thompson, who according to the Sheriff's Return (R. 16) was 
"their Secretary of Company." On the 29th day of November, 
1954 the Court entered the Default of both Defendants (R. 
14) . Judgment by Default was taken against them in the sum 
of $150.00 plus $5.20 costs (R. 13). Thereafter on the 1st 
day of February, 1955, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal 
in the City Court appealing the Judgment taken by the Plaintiff 
to the District Court (R. 12). In connection therewith, De-
fendants also filed a Motion to recall and Dismiss the Execution 
and Attachment theretofore levied by the Plaintiff, pending 
disposition of the cause on Appeal (R. 11), and in support 
thereof filed a corporate stay bond. Defendants Motion was 
noticed for hearing on February 7, 1955 (R. 10) and the Court 
having heard the arguments of Counsel ordered the execution 
and attachment recalled and dismissed pending the disposition 
of the case on appeal (R. 11). Defendants thereupon filed 
their Answer and Counterclaim in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County to the 
Complaint of the Plaintiff formerly filed in the City Court 
(R. 2, 3 and 4) but now filed in the District Court. Thereupon 
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer and 
Counterclaim (R. 7) and a Motion to Dismiss Defendants' 
Appeal (R. 6). Arguments were presented by Counsel and 
on the lOth day of March, 1955, the Court granted Plaintiff's 
Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Appeal (R. 1). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. .That the Trial Court erred in granting Plaintiff's Order 
Dismissing Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The record is clear that more than twenty ( 20) days 
elapsed from the time of the service of Summons in this case 
and that thereafter the City Court entered its Judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff. The record is equally clear, however, 
and there is no dispute on this point, that the Plaintiff at no 
time in this case served upon the Defendants, or either of them, 
a Notice of the entry of the Judgment in the City Court. The 
crux of this case is whether such a notice is necessary under 
the law to toll the right of appeal to the District Court. The 
City Court held that it was in finding in favor of the defendants 
and the District Court held it was not in finding in favor of 
the Plaintiff. 
In this connection, Defendants invite the attention of 
the Court to the provisions of Rule 73 (h) of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure which provides, in part, as follows: 
"(h) Appeal from a judgment rendered in a City or 
Justice Court.-An appeal may be taken to the District 
Court from a final judgment rendered in a City or Justice 
Court within one month after notice of the entry of such 
Judgment or within such shorter time as may be provided 
by law." (Emphasis added.) 
It has always seemed abundantly clear to this writer that 
the language of this rule is clear, concise and unambiguous 
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and that under it, appeal time runs on any final judgment 
entered in a City Court from the date of the notice of entry 
of such judgment. 
The Plaintiff, in the prior arguments of this case, has 
always insisted that other rules found elsewhere in the Civil 
Rules of Procedure which provide that notices generally need 
not be given to a party in default are to be superimposed upon 
Rule 73 (h) in order to make that rule provide that an appeal 
may be taken to the District Court from a final judgment ren-
dered in a City Court within one month after notice of the 
entry of such judgment to all paries not in default. The Court 
below adopted this position. 
It is respectfully submitted by Defendants that such rea-
soning is erroneous for the following reasons: 
FIRST: The rules upon which the Plaintiff has relied are 
clearly and specifically stated to be rules applicable to the 
District Courts. It is true that under Rule 81 (c) these rules 
apply to civil actions in City Courts except in so far as such 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicabe to such Courts or 
proceedings therein. Nothing coud be clearer, however, in the 
matter of the necessity of the notice of the entry of judgment 
than a specific provision such as Rule 73 (h) which clearly 
and unequivocally sets forth the procedure as. to the taking 
of an appeal from the City Court to the District Court. The 
language is plain and unambiguous. No distinction is attempted 
between judgments entered by default or judgments entered 
at the conclusion of the trial of the particular case. This Court 
in promulgating this particular rule has simply and clearly 
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provided that one may appeal to the District Court from a 
final judgment within one month after the notice of entry of 
such judgment. 
SECOND: The reasoning of the Court below is erroneous 
when the Court properly considers the historical aspect of 
the promulgation of Rule 73• (h). It will be remembered that 
the procedure for appeal from a City or Justice Court prior 
to the promulgation of the new Rules of Civil Procedure was 
crystal clear in requiring the prevailing party in any judgment 
rendered in the City or Justice Court to serve upon the adverse 
party a notice of the entry of the judgment in such proceedings 
in order to toll the time within which an appeal might be taken. 
This rule in the City Courts had therefore been established 
by long practice. When the new Rules of Civil Procedure were 
promulgated by this Court on the 1st day of January, 1950, 
Rule 73 (h) was not one of the original rules. On the 3rd 
day of December, 1951, this Court adopted certain amendments 
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to have an effective date 
January 1, 1952, which amendments had been prepared by 
the Committee on preparation of Rules pursuant to the 
direction of the Supreme Court. Among the various amend-
ments made were Rules 73 (h) through ( m). Herein the Court 
adopted a set of rules which it specifically applied to the 
method and means by which appeals should be taken from 
City or Justice Courts to the various District Courts. It is sub-
mitted that it was the intention of the Court in adopting these 
amendments herein referred to to restablish the method of 
taking an appeal to the District Court from a City Court as it 
had been formerly established under the Statutes and Rules 
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of Courts existing prior to the adoption of the new Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Had this Court intended to change the former 
rule, it could have done so very easily by specifically providing 
that a notice of entry of judgment should be required in all 
cases except those involving a default judgment. No such 
limitation was made in the Rule, and it is submitted that none 
was intended; but rather that this Court did intend specifically 
to reinact the former Rule which had been one of long standing 
and wide practice to remain the rule in so far as appeals from 
City Courts were concerned. 
One might speculate as to why, in the original instance, 
notice of the entry of judgment was required in order to toll 
the time for taking an Appeal in the City Courts when such a 
rule was not required in the District Courts. Perhaps no satis-
factory answer can be given to such a query. It would seem 
to this writer, however, that if a valid reason did and does 
now exist for the requirement of the giving of the notice of 
the entry of judgment, the reason is much more persuasive in 
cases in volving a default where a meritorious claim may exist 
in favor of the Defendant than in a case which has been tried 
to the Court and decided at the conclusion of the trial. Cer-
tainly one who is in default is much less likely to know of the 
action which has been taken by the Court than one who has 
been present personally or by and through his Counsel during 
the course of the trial and has heard the Judge announce his 
decision. 
'fHIRD: To adopt the rule as the Court below has done 
1s to violate the \vell settled rules of noscitur a sociis and 
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ejusdem generis. Where one or more of the rules of civil 
procedure announce general statements of procedure but where 
other rules are specific and make particular application to 
specific phases of procedure, the specific will control the gen-
eral. Under these rules of construction, Rule 73 (h) is a 
specific rule having particular application to the precise pro-
cedure to be followed in taking appeals from City or Justice 
Courts and shall control other general rules which at no time 
specifically mention anything concerning city court appeals 
and the requirement of notices of entry of judgment. 
We desire to call to the attention of the Court the fact 
that the appeal from the City Court to the Disrict Court was 
not taken for a frivolous purpose or for the purpose of delay. 
The Answer and Counterclaim filed herein puts in issue valu-
able rights centered around specific performance of an alleged 
Contract for the sale of real property. This mention is made 
only to indicate that the appeal was not one which is sometimes 
taken for what might be termed ''other than legitimate reasons.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants earnestly submit that the granting of Plain-
tiff's Order Dismissing Defendants' Appeal entered in the 
Court below and from which this Appeal is taken is contrary 
to the law and the rules of civil procedure adopted by this 
Court governing the procedure for taking an appeal from the 
City of Justice Court to the District Court. 
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WHEREFORE, Appellants pray that the Order of the 
Court below appealed from be reversed and that the cause 
be remanded with instructions to the Court below to vacate 
said Order. 
Respectfully submttted, 
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON 
Wilford W. Kirton, Jr. 
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